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It is shown that in a generic two-jurisdiction model of the type in-
troduced by Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1997), the number of sorting equilibria
(with jurisdictions providing distinct policies) is ﬁnite and even.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1997) introduce a general class of models with multiple
jurisdictions that can be used to generate equilibrium population sorting under
free mobility. They also provide a sorting equilibrium existence result when
there are two jurisdictions, but only for the case when jurisdictional policies
are even-dimensional. Gomberg (2002) provides a similar result for the odd-
dimensional case.
Until now the issue of local uniqueness and the number of sorting equilibria
in these models has remained unexplored. At the same time, much of the applied
work in this area involved comparative statics analysis, which implicitly assumes
at least local uniqueness of equilibrium. The present paper intends to feel in
this gap in the literature.
The key diﬃculty involved in establishing both the existence results of the
earlier work and those of this paper lies in the fact that in addition to sorting
equilibria these model also typically possess equilibria in which all jurisdictions
provide identical policies and the, consequently indiﬀerent, population is dis-
tributed to support such outcomes. Such equilibria, indeed, are often easy to
explicitly construct. Unfortunately, this means that usual (i.e., Brouwer-like)
ﬁxed point results are not suitable to establish results about sorting equilib-
ria. Fortunately, in the two-jurisdiction case the problem may be reduced to a
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1simple mathematical issue of existence of ﬁxed points of maps on spheres. An
interesting implication of this is that sorting equilibria in models of this type
are almost never unique; in fact, the number of equilibria is, generically, even.
The apparently unusual result is easier to understand if one recalls that I only
consider the number of sorting equilibria - that is the number of equilibria with
distinct jurisdictional policies and fully sorting population partitions. One may
therefore conjecture that the number of equilibria with identical jurisdictional
policies supported by the appropriate partitioning of the indiﬀerent population
is odd (at least, as long as it is ﬁnite).
One lesson of this paper is that index theory has a potential for establishing
results on the existence and number of diﬀerent types of equilibria (in this
case, this would be the sorting and the pooling equilibria). This suggests, that
similar techniques could be useful in other models with distinct equilibrium
types, such as, for instance, models asymmetric information. In that case it
could be possible to achieve non-constructive results for existence and number
of pooling and separating equilibria. This is, indeed, related to the approach
of Gale (1992) in his study of existence of separating equilibria in markets with
adverse selection.
Aside from the diﬃculties arising from the fact that the underlying space is
non-contractible, the mathematical tools employed in this paper have been stan-
dard in economics since Debreu (1970). Most of them can be found in Dierker
(1974). For references on the Lefschetz ﬁxed point Theorem see McLennan
(1989) and Brown (1974).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model,
section 3 formulates the main results and section 4 discusses their intuition and
indicates possible extensions.
2 The model
Is h a l lﬁrst outline the model ﬁrst introduced by Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1997).
Let M = {1,2} be the set of jurisdictions;
Xj ⊂ Rn - the set of policies available to community j =1 ,2; for simplicity,
I shall assume that Xj is open.
X ≡ X1 × X2 ⊂ R2n - the set of all possible policy proﬁles;
T =( A,B,µ) - the measure space of agents where B is the (Borel) σ-algebra
over A, µ is a probability measure on A,a n du(.;α):X → R stands for the
utility function of agent type α ∈ A.
Assume that each individual must choose to join exactly one jurisdiction,
resulting in a population partition.
Deﬁnition 1 Ap a i ro fm e a s u r e sσ = {µ1,µ 2} over (A,B) is called an admis-
sible population partition if for any C ∈ B µ(C)=µ1 (C)+µ2 (C)
Given a population partition σ, I shall denote the support of jurisdiction j
population measure µj as Sj. The set of all admissible population partitions
shall be denoted as ˆ Σ.
2Every jurisdiction is assumed to have a well-deﬁned policy rule Pj : ˆ Σ → Xj,
which shall be called its constitution (in the terminology of Caplin and Nale-
buﬀ (1997) such constitutions are called membership-based); let P ≡ {P1,P 2}
denote the proﬁle of constitutions.





An equilibrium is a population partition/policy proﬁle such that everyone
resides in the jurisdiction he or she prefers and policies are set according to
constitutions. I shall concentrate on sorting equilibria, in which jurisdictions
provide distinct policies and individuals of diﬀerent types separate:
Deﬁnition 2 Ap o l i c yp r o ﬁle - admissible population partition pair (x,S) ∈
X × ˆ Σ is said to be a sorting equilibrium (thereafter, just equilibrium) of
E if:
(i) Sj ⊂ {α ∈ A : u(xj;α) ≥ u(xk;α),k6= j} for every j =1 ,2; (free
mobility);
(ii) Pj(S)=xj, for every j =1 ,2; (constitutionality);
(iii) x1 6= x2 (distinct policies).
I impose a number of assumptions on agent preferences and jurisdictional
constitutions, mostly following Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1997) and Gomberg (2002).
The ﬁrst assumption, introduced mainly to simplify the analysis, restricts the
preferences to be linear (up to a transformation of the policy space, this includes,
for instance, CES and Euclidean preferences):
Assumption 1:
(i) (parameter space) A = Rn
(ii) (linear preferences) an individual residing in town j with the policy vector
xj ⊂ Xj receives utility
u(xj;α)=α · xj
The second assumption ensures that the agents’ distribution does not have
a concentration along any hyperplane and that any policy direction is viewed
as “ideal” by some agents (this second part of the assumption could be easily
relaxed).
Assumption 2 (no concentration of agents and full support):
(i)µ is hyperdiﬀuse1 over A.
(ii) the support of µ includes an open neighborhood of the origin.
It is straightforward to see that under assumptions 1 and 2, given a policy
proﬁle such that x1 6= x2, the set of indiﬀerent agents will be a (zero-measure)
hyperplane, while on each side of the hyperplane there will be a positive mass
1I.e., no hyperplane in A of dimension less then n may contain a positive measure of agents
3of agents strictly preferring one jurisdiction’s policy over another. Therefore, if
I identify together all population partitions that diﬀer only by the jurisdiction
choice of a zero measure of agents, the space Σ ⊂ ˆ Σ of population partitions
(S1,S 2) that can be induced by such a policy proﬁle can be parametrized on a
unit sphere Sn−1 = {x ∈ Rn : ||x|| =1 } by the unit vector τS orthogonal to the
hyperplane of indiﬀerent agents.
Assuming constitutions Pj disregard movements of zero-measure coalitions
of agents, P is well-deﬁned when viewed as a function on Σ.G i v e nt h ep r e v i o u s
parametrization, one can write P : Sn−1 → X. I furthermore assume that
given a partition with populations on the opposite sides of a hyperplane, the
jurisdictions indeed choose diﬀerent policies:
Assumption 3: (distinct policy outcomes) for any S ∈ Σ,P 1(τS) 6= P2(τS).
It remains to deﬁne a topology on the space Σ. Fortunately, it turns out
that, given assumption 2 simply taking the usual Euclidean topology on the
parameter space Sn−1 is rather natural, since it has the virtue of deﬁning as
“nearby” partitions that diﬀer in actions of a small measure of agents.2 With
this topology continuity of constitutions simply means that small population
movements result in small policy changes.
Assumption 4: (continuity) P is continuous on Sn−1.
Given a partition S ∈ Σ, the proﬁle of policy functions P induces a position
proﬁle x ∈ X (x1 6= x2 by assumption 3) which, in turn, induces a new partition
S0. Thus, one can deﬁne the mobility map φ : Sn−1 → Sn−1 from the space of




where φ(τS) ∈ Sn−1 is the unit vector normal to the partition hyperplane in-
duced by the policy proﬁle P(τS). If assumption 4 holds, this map is continuous.
It is not hard to see that if τSbelongs to the set of ﬁxed points of φ, F(φ),t h e
constitutional policy proﬁle P(τS) induces back the population partition under





is an equilibrium. Conversely, if τS / ∈ F (φ),
S cannot be an equilibrium partition.
Proposition 3 Under assumptions 1-3, 4 the pair (x∗,S∗) ∈ X×Σ is a sorting
equilibrium if and only if τS∗
∈ F (φ)and x∗ = P(τS∗
).
2In general, if we were to require a topology on a larger subspace of the partition space
ˆ Σ, where such simple parametrization is not available, we might consider topologies explored
in the study of information partitions, such as the topology induced by the variation semi-










4The ﬁnal assumption used in Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1997) and Gomberg
(2002), which can often be motivated by the jurisdictions choosing policies op-
timally, given their own populations, says that once the policies are set in a
constitutional fashion, it will never be the case that the populations of towns
simply reverse. In its simplest form it can be stated as:




3 The number of equilibria.
In this section it shall be shown that for “most” diﬀerentiable constitution pro-
ﬁles of two-jurisdiction economies there exists at most a ﬁnite number of equi-
libria. Furthermore, somewhat unusually, this number is guaranteed to be even.
The basic approach of this section is to deﬁne the class of “regular” smooth
policy proﬁles for which the number of equilibria can easily be seen to be ﬁnite
and then to show that this class, in fact, contains “almost all” smooth policy
proﬁles.
I shall denote as K ⊂ C1(Sn−1,X) the set of all continuously diﬀerentiable
constitutions such that assumption 5 holds. I next assume that policy spaces
of jurisdictions, in fact, have a non-empty interior, so that the actual policies
can be perturbed in any direction and that policy rules are in fact smooth maps
into the interior of X.




int(Xj), j =1 ,2.
It can be shown that if assumption 6 holds φ ∈ C1(Sn−1,Sn−1).
For any f ∈ C1(Sn−1,Sn−1),D f(x) denotes the derivative of f at x.





in a diﬀerentiable two-jurisdiction




For regular ﬁxed points τ ∈ F (φ), indτ (φ)=sgn|IdRn − Dφ(τ)| = ±1.
It is immediate that any regular ﬁxed point of φ corresponds to an isolated
equilibrium of the model that is also robust to small perturbations of φ.





called regular if all ﬁxed points of the mobility map φ are regular.
It can be shown that regular economies are, in the usual sense, generic:
Proposition 6 Under assumptions 1-6, the set R ⊂ K of constitutions P such
that the economy is regular is open and dense in K.
Proof. Part I. Density.
I shall consider two separate cases: n -e v e na n dn -o d d .
Case I. n -e v e n .
5Take an arbitrary P ∈ K. For every θ in a small neighborhood of π
2 consider
the n × n square matrix
Bn (θ)=

         

sinθ cosθ 00 ... ... 00
−cosθ sinθ 00 ... ... 00
00 s i n θ cosθ ... ... 00
00 −cosθ sinθ ... ... 00
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
0000 ... ... sinθ cosθ
0000 ... ... −cosθ sinθ

         

Let


















aw e l l - d e ﬁned constitution for such θ.










It can be easily shown that, one can approximate P(τS) by P(τS,θ) for θ suﬃ-
ciently close to π
2, i.e. for any ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that if |θ− π
















6= P2(τS) for θ suﬃ-
ciently close to π









is continuously diﬀerentiable in τS a n da s s u m p t i o n5i se a s i l ys a t i s ﬁed for θ
around π
2.
One can use a small neighborhood U of π
2 as a parameter space for the class





− τS is transversal to zero. Applying the transversality
theorem (theorem 9.1 in Dierker 1974) one gets that the set of θ with only regular
ﬁxed points is dense in U and that therefore the set of constitutions with only
regular equilibria is dense in K.
Case II. n - odd.
Consider the n × n matrix
6Bn (θ)=

           

1 0000 ... ... 00
0s i n θ cosθ 00 ... ... 00
0 −cosθ sinθ 00 ... ... 00
00 0s i n θ cosθ ... ... 00
00 0 −cosθ sinθ ... ... 00
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
0 0000 ... ... sinθ cosθ
0 0000 ... ... −cosθ sinθ

           

As






If φ = IdSn−1, then for all θ in some open neighborhood U of π
2 there exist only




:( 1 ,0,...,0) and (−1,0,...,0).I n f a c t , b y d i r e c t
computation, both are easily seen to be regular.
Let φ 6= IdSn−1.B y c o n t i n u i t y o f φ t h e r ee x i s t sa no p e ns e tV ⊂ Sn−1
such that V ∩ F (f)=∅. Without loss of generality, there exists τS ∈ V such
that −τS ∈ V (otherwise, one can diﬀeomorphically distort coordinates on the
sphere to achieve this). Give τS coordinates (1,0,...,0) and apply the above
approximation. For any τS ∈ F (f), therefore, φ(.;θ) is a submersion of U
into Sn−1 and the rest of the argument above holds.
Part II. R is open.
The set of all φ ∈ C1 which have only regular ﬁx e dp o i n t si so p e ni nt h eC1
topology of uniform convergence. Indeed, suppose otherwise. Then there exists
as e q u e n c eφk → φ ∈ R in C1(Sn−1,Sn−1), such that for every k det(IdSn−1 −
Dφk)=0for some yk ∈ F (φk).S i n c e Sn−1 is compact one can ﬁn dac o n -
vergent subsequence ykl → y ∈ Sn−1. The uniform convergence of φkl → φ ∈
C1(Sn−1,Sn−1) implies that φ(y)=y and det(IdSn−1 − Dφ)=0at y - contra-
diction.
It is therefore suﬃcient to show that for any ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such
that ||f − P||C1 < δ implies ||φ −
f1−f2
||f1−f2||||C1 < ε.
In fact, this is going to be true, as long as both φ and its derivative are
uniformly bounded. But that is clearly the case since, by assumption A3 for any
S ∈ Σ,P 1(τS) 6= P2(τS). Together with continuity of Pj’s (assumption A4) this
implies that there exists η > 0 such that for any S ∈ Σ, ||P1(τS) − P2(τS)|| ≥
η. Since, furthermore, the domain of φ is compact, the uniform boundedness
follows. I shall take an open neighborhood V ⊂ C1(Sn−1,X) of P deﬁned by
V = {f ∈ C1(Sn−1,X):||f − P||C1 < δ}. It is not hard to show that as
δ → 0 ||f1(τS) − f2(τS)|| has to likewise be bounded away from zero, which
indeed ensures convergence of
f1−f2
||f1−f2|| to φ in C1 topology.
I th a st h u sb e e ns h o w nt h a to n ei sj u s t i ﬁed in concentrating, primarily, on
regular economies. For these, the following general result is true.
Theorem 7 Under assumptions 1-6 in regular two-jurisdiction economies the
7number of sorting equilibria is ﬁnite and even (and this number can be guaran-
teed to be non-zero if n is odd).3
Proof. The proof of ﬁniteness of the number of regular ﬁxed points is
standard (see Dierker 1974). The unusual part is the evenness, which follows







0,n-even . Furthermore, from the weak
Pareto condition (A5) I know that φ(τS) 6= −τS. Consequently, for any t ∈ [0,1]
||tτS +( 1− t)φ
¡
τS¢
|| 6=0 . Therefore, one can construct a homotopy map
H(S,t)=
tτS +( 1− t)φ
¡
τS¢
||tτS +( 1− t)φ(τS)||
But this implies that the Lefschetz number of the mobility map Λ(φ)=χ
¡
Sn−1¢
is even. But Λ(φ)=
P
τ∈F(φ) indτφ which implies that for any regular φ the
number of equilibria is indeed even.
4 Discussion and further research
In this paper it is shown that subject to a generic regularity condition on policy
functions, there is a ﬁnite and even number of sorting equilibria in the models
of Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1997) and Gomberg (2002).
A further intriguing intuition for the result can be obtained by considering
the diagonal ∆ of the policy proﬁle space (i.e., the set of policy proﬁles such
that x1 = x2). In Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1997) and Gomberg (2002) approach to
the problem one “excises” this diagonal by assuming that once the jurisdictions
adopt distinct (“oﬀ-diagonal”) policies they will never be mapped into the di-
agonal. In fact, it is due to this excision from the policy proﬁle space (the dual
of Σ)t h a tΣ has a whole of the dimension equal to the dimension of ∆.
Admittedly, since when the policies are identical the entire population is
indiﬀerent as to the location choice, any population partition in the larger space
ˆ Σ can be sustained under free mobility by any policy proﬁle on the diagonal.
Consequently, one can extend the mobility mapping to ∆ by deﬁning φ(σ)=ˆ Σ
for any σ ∈ ˆ Σ such that P (σ) ∈ ∆ (of course, now φ is a correspondence, rather
than a function). With this extension, every equilibrium (including the pooling
ones) corresponds to the ﬁxed points of φ.
Unfortunately, unlike Σ,t h es p a c eˆ Σ cannot be viewed as a subset of the Eu-
clidean space. The arguments become more transparent if one instead considers












3To ensure actual sorting equilibrium existence when n is even additional assumptions are
needed (see Caplin and Nalebuﬀ 1997).
8A si st h ec a s ef o rφ, it is not hard to see that every equilibrium corresponds
to a ﬁxed point of χ. Clearly, χ is upper hemi-continuous; suppose, further,
it is contractible-valued. Since X is a subset of R2n it is possible to extend
the notion of the ﬁxed point index for χ (see McLennan (1989) for deﬁning the
index for correspondences). Furthermore, if X is contractible the sum of the
indices over all ﬁxed points should be equal to 1. The main result of this paper
suggests that, under the assumptions above, this number for the diagonal would
indeed be equal to ±1 - that is, if the number of pooling equilibria is ﬁnite one
would expect it to be odd.
Reversing the argument of the previous paragraph suggests that by studying
the action of the mobility mapping near the diagonal of the policy proﬁle space
it would be possible to obtain an alternative argument for the number of sorting
equilibria. Indeed, given the complexity of the space of sorting population
partitions when the number of jurisdictions is greater than two, this approach
may be preferable for extending the two-jurisdiction results in the literature to
the general multi-jurisdiction case.
As noted in the introduction, the index theory approach may be useful in
studying existence of diﬀerent types of equilibria in models of asymmetric infor-
mation, as in Gale (1992). In that paper, however, the separating equilibrium
existence has been achieved by showing that pooling equilibria, in that setting,
are inessential, in the sense that they are destroyed under small perturbations
of the model (see McLennan 1989 for the deﬁnition of essential ﬁxed points).
Since the index of inessential ﬁxed points has to be equal to zero (proposition
4.6 in McLennan 1989), the results of this paper are valid even when all types
of equilibria are robust to small changes in the model.
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